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Abstract: This paper develops a two-country model where each invests in a local public good
which produces positive externalities. Each country’s effort investment is private information and
cannot be directly observed. It is only inferred from the observed level of public output which
depends on the investment effort devoted towards its production. In a repeated game setting, we
characterize the condition for the existence of a cut-off trigger strategy equilibrium such that the
two countries have no incentives to deviate from full cooperation. If it exists, this cut-off point is
shown to be decreasing in the spillover parameter and in the length of the punishment period. Fi-
nally, we show that increasing the correlation between the two country-specific shocks surprisingly
restricts the prospects for cooperation.
Keywords: Local Public Goods, Externality, Imperfect Information, Repeated Game.
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1 Introduction
In the presence of spillovers, decentralized provision of local public goods leads to an inefficient
outcome. If, however, local jurisdictions have repeated interactions, they may tacitly cooperate so
as to internalize cross-border externalities. Indeed, according to the “folk theorems” cooperation
can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium of a repeated game by strategies of reciprocity as long
as one’s partner does not discount the future too heavily. Our objective in this paper is then
to explore the consequences of imperfect information with respect to the cost levels of the local
public goods, provided by neighboring jurisdictions, on the sustainability of efficient outcomes in
an infinitely repeated game.
The literature on local public good provision typically deals with perfect information situations.
In several circumstances, however, there is an information asymmetry with respect to local cost
conditions. One can think of the costs of research and development activities or the costs of
investment in environmental quality. For example, Cornes and Silva (2000, 2002) refer to an
analysis of Ma¨ler (1991) who noted about the Acid rain problem in Europe that “the control costs
and environmental damage in one particular country is known to that country only”. It is also
well recognized in the literature on fiscal federalism that private information with respect to both
preferences and cost conditions raises important challenges for the design of transfer schemes at
the central level (e.g., Costello (1993)). Clearly, imperfect information about technology and local
cost conditions may impose significant constraints on the ability of local jurisdictions to achieve
an efficient outcome. In particular, in a dynamic setting, this can decrease the effectiveness of
the threat of non-cooperation in the future (to sustain cooperation today) since deviations from
cooperation may only imperfectly detected.
We develop a two-country model where each provides a local public good. These public goods
produce spillover benefits which are enjoyed by residents of the other country. The output of the
public good in each country is a function of the cost of effort devoted towards its production plus a
country-specific shock. While public output in each country is perfectly observed, the cost of effort
in each country is private information and thereby cannot be directly observed in the other country.
Finally, we consider that the situation is repeated over time so that the two countries may tacitly
cooperate and internalize externalities through decentralized strategies of reciprocity. Specifically,
we focus in this paper on cut-off trigger strategy equilibria. In other words, each country produces
the optimal level of effort as long as each country’s realized public output is above a given level.
If realized public output in one or both country falls below this level or cut-off point, the two
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countries switch to the static non-cooperative outcome for 푇 periods regardless of what happens
to public output in each country during this period. At the end of the non-cooperative episode, i.e.
푇 +1 periods after public output in one or both countries had fallen, they will resume cooperation.
We characterize a sufficient condition for the existence of such a cut-off point (also called the
trigger public output) such that cooperation can be sustained. We then show that this cut-off
point decreases both in the length of the punishment period and in the spillover parameter. In
other words, as the spillover effect or the number of periods of punishment increases, it becomes
more likely that the two countries maintain cooperation. We analyze, in turn, the impact of the
correlation between the two country-specific shocks on the incentives for each country to produce
the optimal level of effort. Interestingly, we show that increasing the correlation coefficient from 0
reduces the prospects for cooperation in the sense that it decreases, for a given level of the cut-off
point, the marginal benefit of exerting effort compared to the case of independent shocks.
The present paper is related to the general problem of tacit cooperation in a dynamic game
setting with imperfect monitoring initiated by Porter (1983) and Green and Porter (1984). Al-
though, this problem has been extensively analyzed in dynamic oligopoly models, it has not been
explored in a model of provision of local public goods. For example, McMillan (1979) and more
recently Pecorino (1999) analyze a repeated game setting for the private provision of public good
but without uncertainty. Recently, public economists have put under scrutiny the implications
of imperfect information on the costs of providing local public services, in particular in a static
setting, for the allocation of resources between members of a federation (see, e.g. Lockwood (1999)
and references therein). In the present paper, we analyze the implications of information asymme-
try with respect to cost levels of local public goods on the ability of independent jurisdictions to
sustain cooperation in a repeated game setting.
Our analysis is also related to the literature on inter-governmental yardstick competition initi-
ated by Salmon (1987) and Besley and Case (1995).1 Indeed, when there is shock-interdependence
the evaluation of government policy in one country depends on government performance in neigh-
boring countries. In a static setting, yardstick competition mechanisms that rely on an informa-
tional externality in general help to enhance efficiency. In a dynamic setting with no monetary
transfers between parties, we show that such a mechanism may restrict the prospects for future
cooperation.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 by presenting the model. In Section
1This theory has been further developed by, among others, Sand-Zantman (2004), Belleflamme and Hindriks
(2005), Revelli (2006), and Besley and Smart (2007).
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3, we characterize the cut-off trigger strategy equilibrium of the repeated game with imperfect
monitoring. In Section 4, we examine how shock-interdependence affects this equilibrium outcome.
Section 5 offers a brief conclusion.
2 The Stage Game
We consider a world consisting of two neighboring countries. Each country has a population size
normalized to 1 and there is no mobility across countries. In each country all individuals have
identical endowments 푦 and consume a private good and two public services, each one associated
with a particular country. A given level of investment 푒푗 in the 푗th country will give the following
level of public services in that country
푞푗 = 푒푗 + 휀푗 푗 = 1, 2, (1)
where 푒푗 is the level of investment or effort (number of civil servants, level of infrastructure) chosen
by the government of the 푗th country. 푒푗 is not observable by the citizens of country 푘. 휀푗 is a
random shock that follows a normal law with mean 0 and variance 휎2 for 푗 = 1, 2. Individual
private consumption in country 푗 is 푥푗 = 푦− 푐 (푒푗) where 푐 (푒푗) is the cost of producing 푒푗 units of
effort investments in public goods. We assume a convex cost function as it follows
푐 (푒푗) = 푒
2
푗/2, 푗 = 1, 2. (2)
Individuals in the two countries have the same preferences for private and public consumption.
These preferences are represented by a linear utility function
푈푗 = 푥푗 +
[푞푗 + 훽푞푘]
1 + 훽
, 푗 ∕= 푘 (3)
where 훽 represents the intensity of cross-country spillovers related to public service provision.
When 훽 = 0, citizens care only about the public good in their own country, while when 훽 = 1 they
care equally about public spending in both countries. We also assume that the exogenous income 푦
is sufficiently high to always allow positive consumption of the private good. This implies together
with linearity of preferences that there are no wealth effects.
Let 푊푗 be the expected level of public goods surplus in country 푗. We have 푊푗 = 퐸
[
[푞푗+훽푞푘]
1+훽
]
−
푒2푗/2 =
[푒푗+훽푒푘]
1+훽 −푒2푗/2 since 휀푗 has a 0 mean for 푗 = 1, 2. Suppose first, that each country maximizes
its own expected surplus 푊푗 with respect to 푒푗 given the other country’s choice of effort investment.
In the Nash equilibrium, both countries invest 푒˜ = 1/ (1 + 훽) . This gives the following equilibrium
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level of expected public services surplus for both countries 푊푁 = (1 + 2훽) /
[
2 (1 + 훽)
2
]
which is
decreasing in the spillover parameter.
If, however, both countries manage to cooperate, they maximize the sum of the expected surplus
i.e. 푊1 + 푊2 with respect to both 푒1 and 푒2. The Bowen-Lindhal-Samuelson condition gives the
common optimal level of effort investment i.e. 푒∗ = 1. The level of expected public goods surplus,
in that case, is then 푊퐶 = 1/2 which is independent of the size of the spillover effect. This
comes from the symmetry of the model and from our specification of the utility function that is
normalized with the spillover parameter.
If each country’s effort were publicly observable, it would be straightforward to show that the
efficient outcome can be supported as a trigger strategy equilibrium as long as both countries are
sufficiently patient. Specifically, if one country (let say country 1) defects from the cooperative
outcome, it would choose the same level of effort investment as in the Nash outcome i.e. 푒˜ =
1/ (1 + 훽). Hence, the equilibrium level of surplus of the country that defects would be 푊퐷 =
[1 + 2훽 (1 + 훽)] /
[
2 (1 + 훽)
2
]
which is increasing in the spillover parameter. Let 푣푖 =
∞∑
푡=0
훿푡푊푖
be the discounted sum of country 푖’s stage game payoffs where 0 < 훿 < 1 is the discount factor.
Then the optimal outcome can be sustained through the threat of permanently reverting to the
non-cooperative outcome if and only if 훿 ≥ 1/2. Note that, in the case of perfect information,
an infinite punishment period maximizes the prospects for cooperation because deviations are
perfectly detected.
3 Cooperation Under Imperfect Monitoring
Consider now the repeated game with imperfect monitoring. The two countries meet each period
to play the stage game described above, where each country has the objective of maximizing its
expected discounted stream of public good surplus. When entering a period, a country observes
only the history of its own level of effort and realized public output in the two countries. Following
Green and Porter (1984) and Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994), we restrict attention to those
equilibria in which countries’ strategies only depend on realized public outputs and not on their own
private history of policy schedule. Such strategies are called public strategies and such equilibria
are called perfect public equilibria (PPE).
As is typical in repeated games, there can be many perfect public equilibria in our game many
of which can involve complicated strategies. We then make two restrictions. First, as in Green
and Porter (1984), we consider equilibria with two levels of effort in public investment and with
symmetric strategies. In addition, we constraint the two countries to choosing either the non-
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cooperative level of effort, i.e. 푒˜ = 1/ (1 + 훽), or the first-best level of effort of the stage game, i.e.
푒∗ = 1. We then presuppose, as in Green and Porter (1984), special forms for the cooperative and
punishment phases. More precisely, as a part of their strategies, the two countries must decide
when to produce the cooperative or the non-cooperative level of effort as a function of public
histories.
We also consider, for the moment, that the two country-specific shocks are independently
distributed over time and across countries. Hence, high public output realizations in a particular
country would tend to suggest that this country has produced the optimal level of effort while low
realizations would tend to suggest that this country has defected. Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti
(1986, 1990) show that if the conditional distribution of the public signal given effort satisfies the
Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) then a tail test is the optimal statistical criterion
for the players to adopt.2 This implies the existence of a critical level of the observable public
output denoted 푞ˆ such that if public output falls below this value in any country, punishment is
triggered. We finally assume that the punishment lasts for 푇 periods.
Each country then uses the following cut-off strategy : (i) to choose the optimal level of effort
푒∗ in the first period and to continue to do so as long as the observed level of public output in each
country is as high as 푞ˆ in both countries; (ii) if public output in one or both countries fall below
푞ˆ at some period 푡, then to produce the non-cooperative level of effort 푒˜ for 푇 periods and then
return to the cooperative level of effort until public output in one or both countries fall (again)
below 푞ˆ. The probability of maintaining cooperation next period is then given by
휇(푒1, 푒2) = 푃푟표푏[휀1 ≥ 푞ˆ − 푒1].푃 푟표푏[휀2 ≥ 푞ˆ − 푒2]. (4)
Using the properties of the normal distribution and denoting Φ the cumulative of a standard normal
law (with mean equal to 0 and variance equal to 1), this probability can be written as it follows
휇(푒1, 푒2) =
(
1− Φ
[
푞ˆ − 푒1
휎
])
.
(
1− Φ
[
푞ˆ − 푒2
휎
])
. (5)
Let 푉 퐶푡 (respectively 푉
푃
푡 ) be the present discounted value of a country’s payoff from date 푡 on,
assuming that at date 푡 the game is in the cooperative (respectively punishment) phase. We have
푉 퐶푡 = 푊 (푒1, 푒2) + 훿
[
휇(푒1, 푒2)푉
퐶
푡+1 + (1− 휇(푒1, 푒2))푉 푃푡+1
]
. (6)
푉 퐶푡 equals present period expected payoff plus expected future payoffs in present discounted value.
Next period, either cooperation is continued (with probability 휇(푒1, 푒2)) or the implicit contrac-
2Formally, let 퐹 (푞 ∣푒) the cumulative distribution of public output given effort, with density 푓(푞 ∣푒) . It satisfies
the MLRP if for two values of effort 푒1 and 푒2 with 푒1 > 푒2, we have that 푓(푞 ∣푒1) /푓(푞 ∣푒2) is increasing in 푞.
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tual agreement is broken (with probability 1 − 휇 (푒1, 푒2)) in which case both countries enter the
punishment phase and do not cooperate for 푇 periods.
We can now analyze the optimal behavior of each country. Let first state the following Lemma.3
Lemma 1 Let assume that region 2 acts cooperatively i.e. 푒2 = 푒
∗. A necessary and sufficient
condition for 푒1 = 푒
∗ to be an individual optimal strategy for region 1 is given by the first-order
condition, i.e.,
∂푉 푐푡
∂푒1
∣푒1=푒∗ = 0.
Using (6), we have
∂푉 퐶푡
∂푒1
∣푒1=푒∗ =
∂푊 (푒1, 푒
∗)
∂푒1
∣푒1=푒∗ + 훿
[
푉 퐶푡+1 − 푉 푃푡+1
] ∂휇 (푒1, 푒∗)
∂푒1
∣푒1=푒∗ = 0. (7)
The time invariant nature of our framework implies that if the cooperative level of effort is an
optimal strategy for country 1 today, it will also be an optimal strategy for that country in the
future. Hence, this condition may be written equivalently as
∂푉 퐶
∂푒1
∣푒1=푒∗ = 0⇔
훽
1 + 훽
− 훿 [푉 퐶 − 푉 푃 ] ∂휇 (푒1, 푒∗)
∂푒1
∣푒1=푒∗ = 0. (8)
The first term of the above expression represents the expected marginal benefit from under-
producing effort investments in public goods. When country 1 decreases its effort below the optimal
level of effort, it free-rides onto the other country and the expected marginal benefit of deviation
is increasing in the spillover parameter. The second term corresponds to the expected marginal
loss in future payoffs from possibly triggering a punishment phase. This expected marginal cost
of deviation is the product of two terms. The first term corresponds to the difference between the
expected discounted payoff of cooperation and the expected discounted payoff of non-cooperation.
The second term corresponds to the marginal probability that the game remains in the coop-
erative phase. As shown below, when country 1 decreases its effort below the optimal level of
effort, it contributes to decrease the marginal probability of remaining in the cooperative phase.
Therefore, the optimal level of effort 푒∗ = 1 is a best-response to the predicted action of country
2 when the expected marginal benefit exactly balance the marginal cost from under-producing
public investments.
Let first characterize the difference between the expected discounted payoff of cooperation and
that of non-cooperation, i.e. 푉 퐶 −푉 푃 . 푉 푃 consists of playing the Nash-equilibrium for 푇 periods
3All proofs are given in the Appendix
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and resume cooperation at the 푇 + 1th period. Formally, we have
푉 푃 = 푊푁 + 훿푊푁 + ...+ 훿푇−1푊푁 + 훿푇푉 퐶
=
1− 훿푇
1− 훿 푊
푁 + 훿푇푉 퐶 (9)
Inserting this expression into equation (6) and dropping the time subscript leads to
푉 퐶 =
푊푁
1− 훿 +
푊퐶 −푊푁
1− 훿휇(푒∗)− 훿푇+1(1− 휇(푒∗)) (10)
where 휇 (푒∗) ≡ 휇(푒∗, 푒∗). Hence, using (9), we have
푉 퐶 − 푉 푃 = (1− 훿
푇 )
[
푊퐶 −푊푁 ]
1− 훿휇(푒∗)− 훿푇+1(1− 휇(푒∗)) (11)
Recalling that 푊푁 = [1 + 2훽] /
[
2 (1 + 훽)
2
]
and 푊퐶 = 1/2. Using these expressions, the necessary
and sufficient first-order condition given by (8) can then be rewritten as
−훽
1 + 훽
+
훿(1− 훿푇 )훽2
2(1 + 훽)2
∂휇(푒1,푒
∗)
∂푒1
∣푒1=푒∗
1− 훿휇(푒∗)− 훿푇+1(1− 휇(푒∗)) = 0 (12)
This equilibrium condition imposes some restrictions on the level of the trigger output 푞ˆ and on
the structural parameters 훿, 훽 and 휎.
Let first characterize the marginal probability that the game remains in the cooperative phase.
Using (5), it is easy to see that
∂휇 (푒1, 푒
∗)
∂푒1
∣푒1=푒∗ =
푒−
(푞ˆ−푒∗)2
2휎2
휎
√
2휋
.(1− Φ
[
푞ˆ − 푒∗
휎
]
) > 0 (13)
Let 퐺 = 푞ˆ − 푒∗ be the difference between the trigger output and the optimal level of effort. Then
using (5) and (13), (12) can then be rewritten as 푅(퐺) = 0 with
푅 (퐺) =
−훽
1 + 훽
+
훿(1− 훿푇 )훽2
2(1 + 훽)2
Φ퐺(1− Φ)
1− 훿 (1− Φ)2 − 훿푇+1 (1− (1− Φ)2) (14)
where Φ퐺 is the density function and where the arguments of both Φ and Φ퐺 is 퐺/휎. Again,
the expected marginal return to a country from decreasing its effort balances exactly the marginal
increase in risk of incurring a loss in returns by triggering a reversion to the non-cooperative
outcome.
The following Proposition characterizes the existence of a cut-off trigger strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 1 : The 푅 (퐺) function given by (14) is single-peaked with a unique maximum
denoted 퐺˜. Hence, there exists a cut-off trigger strategy equilibrium given by (푞ˆ, 푇 ) if and only if
푅
(
퐺˜
)
≥ 0, and where 푞ˆ is such that 푅(푞ˆ − 푒∗) = 0.
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The 푅 (퐺) function has the shape as shown in figure 1. (14) has then either no solutions or two
solutions, depending on whether 푅
(
퐺˜
)
is negative or positive.
G0
R(G)
퐺∗ = 푞ˆ − 푒∗
퐺˜
Figure 1
When 푅
(
퐺˜
)
≥ 0, 푅(퐺) = 0 has two solutions and the smaller solution yields the cut-off
point 푞ˆ4 as a function (among other things) of the level of effort 푒∗ that both countries produce
in cooperative periods, and of 푇 which is the length of episodes during which countries revert to
the static non-cooperative outcome. This proposition states that, even though there is imperfect
monitoring, the first-best level of effort 푒∗ of the stage game can be sustained by the players’ threats
to revert for 푇 periods to the one-shot non-cooperative equilibrium in case of a deviation from
the prescribed strategy. However, compared to the case of perfect monitoring, tacit cooperation
works less well since the two countries switch (periodically) to the non-cooperative outcome on the
equilibrium path. Put another way, in equilibrium, punishment is not triggered by the inference
that one country deviated in the previous period. Rather, each country correctly presumes that
its partner produced the optimal level of effort and that public service provision was low because
of a negative shock. Reversion to the non-cooperative outcome is however necessary in this case
because if the punishment did not occur when public output was low, the two countries would not
have any incentives to cooperate.
It is also worth pointing out that reversionary episodes must last for some periods. Indeed,
when 푇 = 0, we have 푅 (퐺) = −훽/(1 +훽) < 0 which implies there does not exist a trigger strategy
4The two solutions have the same impact on efforts but the lower 퐺∗ (hence the lower 푞ˆ), the larger is the
probability that the game remains in the cooperative phase.
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equilibrium that supports the first-best level of effort 푒∗. This is also the case when the variance
of each country-specific shock is large or when countries are not patient enough. To see this point,
assume that the length of the punishment period is infinite, i.e. 푇 → ∞. Then the inequality
푅
(
퐺˜
)
≥ 0 reduces to 훿 ≥ 훿˜ with
훿˜ =
2(1 + 훽)
(1− Φ) [훽Φ퐺 + 2 (1 + 훽) (1− Φ)] (15)
The density function is Φ퐺 =
1
휎
√
2휋
푒−
(푞ˆ−푒∗)2
2휎2 and so 훿˜ is lower than 1 if and only if the variance of
each shock is sufficiently small. Indeed, when the variance of each shock is large, it is extremely
difficult to infer the behavior of each country which in turn can make tacit cooperation impossible
to sustain.
The following Proposition establishes the comparative statics for the cut-off point.
Proposition 2 : If it exists, the cut-off point 푞ˆ is decreasing both in the length of the punishment
period 푇 and in the spillover parameter 훽; the impact of an increase in the standard deviation 휎
of each shock on 푞ˆ is, however, indeterminate.
When cooperation is feasible, the admissible value of the difference between the observed level
of public service in each country and the optimal level of investment is decreasing both in the
spillover parameter and in the length of the punishment period. In other words, cooperation will
be more easily sustained if punishment is harsher (greater 푇 ) or if public good spillovers are more
important (greater 훽). Indeed, the value of the cut-off point that enforces cooperation between the
two countries must balance two objectives. On the one hand, it must be high enough to provide the
countries some incentives to cooperate. On the other hand, it must be sufficiently low to decrease
the probability of triggering a punishment inappropriately. If 푇 or 훽 increases, the two countries
have more incentives to cooperate and consequently the optimal trigger output must be lower to
account for the possibility of negative shocks.
The impact of the variance of each shock on the cut-off point 푞ˆ is, however, indeterminate.
Increasing the standard deviation has indeed two conflicting effects on the cut-off value. First, it
raises the risk of triggering a punishment inappropriately. This effect calls for a lower value of the
cut-off point. Second, it diminishes the marginal impact of each country’s effort on the resulting
public output. This effect calls for a higher cut-off value in order to preserve the incentives to
cooperate. The net effect is indeterminate and we cannot assess the impact of uncertainty on the
degree of stringency of cut-off rules. In any case, as discussed above, the first-best level of effort
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푒∗ can not be sustained as perfect public equilibrium if the distribution of each-country specific
shock is too “noisy”.
Finally, we can determine the optimal punishment length. Proposition 2 implies that longer
punishment periods reduce both the trigger output and the probability that punishment is triggered
inappropriately. Infinite punishment then maximizes the probability that the game remains in
the cooperative phase, but at the risk of being stuck (in case of a bad shock) at the one-shot
non-cooperative outcome forever. Therefore, in general and in contrast to repeated games with
perfect monitoring, infinite punishment is not optimal. Indeed, on can observe that each country’s
equilibrium payoff (given by (10)) decreases in the length of the punishment period. Therefore, the
optimal punishment length 푇˜ is the smallest 푇 satisfying the incentive constraint 푅(퐺) = 0 and
is finite if 훿 > 훿˜. Indeed, this last condition implies that 푅
(
퐺˜
)
is strictly positive when the length
of the punishment period is infinite, which implies that there exists a finite value of 푇 satisfying
푅
(
퐺˜
)
≥ 0. In addition, from the proof of Proposition 2, we know that the 푅(퐺) function increases
in the length of non-cooperative episodes. This implies that the optimal punishment length 푇˜ is
such that 푅
(
퐺˜
)
= 0 which in turn determines - with the first-order condition 푅′
(
퐺˜
)
= 0 by
definition of 퐺˜ - the optimal trigger output 푞˜. This is summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: If 훿 > 훿˜, there exists an optimal trigger equilibrium
(
푞˜, 푇˜
)
such that 푅
(
퐺˜
)
= 0,
where 푇˜ is positive and finite.
If countries are sufficiently patient, there exists an optimal trigger strategy equilibrium which
supports the first-best level of effort 푒∗ of the stage game. In this equilibrium, there are cooperative
phases of stochastic length and punishment phases that last 푇˜ periods, which are triggered when
realized public output in one or both countries fall below the trigger output 푞˜.
4 Imperfect Monitoring with Correlation
In this Section, we assume the existence of a cut-off trigger strategy equilibrium and we analyze
the impact of the correlation between the two country-specific shocks. Indeed, it is reasonable
to believe that neighboring jurisdictions face similar socioeconomic environments and are likely
to experience similar shocks. In the context of our framework, such an informational externality
would thus make it possible to infer more accurately each country’s effort in public investment. It is
then tempting to conclude, that shock-interdependence would enhance efficiency. Interestingly, we
show that a small correlation gives rise to a sort of information manipulation that can undermine
the standard positive effect of correlation on the agency problem.
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Before proceeding, it might be useful to give an intuition of this result. As in the model without
correlation, a tail test is the optimal statistical criterion for the countries to adopt. However, shock-
interdependence brings some information which allows (with the use of observable variables) to
make inference on actions with much higher precision than without shock-interdependence. Indeed,
when shocks are independently distributed across countries, the best estimate of each country’s
effort is the observed level of public output. With correlated noise, however, the observed level
of public output in one country can be compared to that in the other country to estimate more
accurately each country’s effort. Reversion to the non-cooperative outcome is then triggered when
the estimated level of effort in one country (or both) - given the observed level of public output in
the two countries - is lower than some threshold.
Suppose now that one country (let say country 2) produces the first-best level of effort but
that country 1 considers the possibility of deviating from this level. If country 1 indeed decides to
shirk, it leads to decrease the expected level of public output observed in country 1. This in turn
diminishes, for a certain threshold, the probability that the cut-off rule associated to country 1 is
satisfied. But a low realization of the public signal in country 1 would also induce a low realization
of the public signal in country 2 because of the positive correlation between country-specific shocks.
Given that country 2 produces the first-best level of effort, this makes the cut-off rule associated
to country 2 less stringent. This in turn increases the probability that the estimated level of effort
in country 2 lies above the same threshold than the one corresponding to cut-off rule associated to
country 1. The net effect might be positive so that country 1 may have an incentive to decrease
its effort.
We now present the formal analysis of the impact of the correlation between region-specific
shocks on the incentives to cooperate. As before, public output 푞푗 in the 푗th country is given
by 푞푗 = 푒푗 + 휀푗 . We now consider that (휀1, 휀2) follows a normal law with mean equal to 0 and a
variance-covariance matrix equal to
Σ = 휎2
(
1 휌
휌 1
)
(16)
where 휌 is the correlation coefficient.
Each country now uses the following cut-off strategy : (i) to produce the optimal level of effort
푒∗ in the first period and to continue to do so as long as the estimated level of effort in each
country, given the observed levels of public output in both countries, is as high as 푞ˆ; (ii) if the
estimated level of effort in one or both countries fall below 푞ˆ at some period 푡, then to produce the
non-cooperative level of effort 푒˜ for 푇 periods.
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Let 푒ˆ푗 be the estimated level of effort of country 푗 given the equilibrium behavior of the
other country 푒∗ and the observed levels of public output in both countries 푞1 and 푞2. We have
푒ˆ푗 = 퐸[푞푗 − 휀푗 ∣푞1, 푞2, 푒∗] and the cut-off rule associated to each country is then
푒ˆ1 ≥ 푞ˆ ⇔ 푞푗 − 퐸[휀푗 ∣푞1, 푞2, 푒∗] ≥ 푞ˆ. (17)
Let 휀푒푗 = 푞푗 − 푒∗ be the inference made on the shock in country 푗 when this country produces
the optimal level of effort 푒∗. Since 푞푗 = 푒푗 + 휀푗 , we have that 휀푒푗 = 푒푗 − 푒∗ + 휀푗 . If country 푗
indeed produces the optimal level of effort, i.e. 푒푗 = 푒
∗, then the shock in that country is perfectly
inferred from the observation of 푞푗 . In this case, we then have 휀
푒
푗 = 휀푗 . Now, let us suppose that
country 1 considers deviating from 푒∗ by producing some effort 푒1 < 푒∗ but that country 2 indeed
produces 푒∗. The cut-off rule associated to country 1 is
푒ˆ1 ≥ 푞ˆ ⇔ 퐸[푞1 − 휀1∣푞1, 푞2, 푒∗] ≥ 푞ˆ
⇔ 푞1 − 퐸[휀1∣휀푒2 = 푞2 − 푒∗] ≥ 푞ˆ. (18)
where 퐸[휀1∣휀푒2 = 푞2 − 푒∗] = 휌휀푒2 = 휌휀2 since 푒2 = 푒∗. We then have
푒ˆ1 ≥ 푞ˆ ⇔ 휀1 − 휌휀2 ≥ 푞ˆ − 푒1. (19)
The cut-off rule associated to country 2 is
푒ˆ2 ≥ 푞ˆ ⇔ 퐸[푞2 − 휀2∣푞1, 푞2, 푒∗] ≥ 푞ˆ
⇔ 푞2 − 퐸[휀2∣휀푒1 = 푞1 − 푒∗] ≥ 푞ˆ. (20)
Assume that country 2 produces the first-best level of effort and that country 1 in fact decides
to deviate from this level. In this case, the inference made on the shock in country 1 - under the
belief that both countries act optimally - is 휀푒1 = 푒1 − 푒∗ + 휀1. We then have 퐸[휀2∣휀푒1 = 푞1 − 푒∗] =
휌휀푒1 = 휌 [푒1 − 푒∗ + 휀1]. The cut-off rule associated to country 2 is then
푒ˆ2 ≥ 푞ˆ ⇔ 휀2 − 휌휀1 ≥ 푞ˆ − 푒∗ + 휌(푒1 − 푒∗). (21)
To characterize the probability that the game remains in the cooperative phase in the presence of
shock-interdependence, let note 푥 = 휀1 − 휌휀2 and 푦 = 휀2 − 휌휀1. Both 푥 and 푦 follow a normal
law with mean equal to 0, variance equal to (1 − 휌2)휎2 and covariance equal to −휌(1 − 휌2)휎2.
Let 푓(푥, 푦) be the joint density, 푓(푥) and 푓(푦) the marginal densities and 푓(푦∣푥) the conditional
density.
Using (18) and (20), cooperation is continued if and only if{
푥 ≥ 푞ˆ − 푒1
푦 ≥ 푞ˆ − 푒∗ + 휌(푒1 − 푒∗) . (22)
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Since 푥 and 푦 are correlated, the probability that the game remains in the cooperative phase is
then
휇(푒1, 푒
∗) =
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒1
[∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗+휌(푒1−푒∗)
푓(푦∣푥)푑푦
]
푓(푥)푑푥. (23)
As in the analysis without correlation, country 1 trades off the expected static benefit of deviation
and the expected marginal cost from increasing the probability of triggering a T-period reversion
to the Nash outcome. Therefore, the necessary and sufficient first-order condition for 푒1 = 푒
∗ to be
country 1′s best response to the predicted action of country 2 is still given by (12). Our purpose here
is to investigate how an increase in the correlation coefficient 휌 affects this equilibrium condition.
Note that the correlation coefficient has an impact both on the equilibrium probability 휇(푒∗, 푒∗)
and on the marginal probability ∂휇∂푒1 (푒1, 푒
∗) of remaining in the cooperative phase. Unfortunately,
we cannot obtain a general result as to the effect of the correlation coefficient on these probabilities.
However, one can obtain the following interesting local result.
Lemma 2 : Increasing the correlation between the two signals of public output from 0 decreases
both the marginal probability and the equilibrium probability of remaining in the cooperative phase.
Again, increasing the correlation between the two signals of public output from zero increases the
prospect for information manipulation. When country 1 deviates, it becomes less likely that the
cut-off rule associated to country 1 is satisfied but it also becomes more likely that the cut-off rule
associated to country 2 is satisfied. This is because a bad realization of the public signal in country
1 would more likely result (with positive correlation) in a bad realization of the public signal in
country 2. There is thus less chance that the estimated level of effort in country 2 falls below the
cut-off point 푞ˆ. It turns out that when the correlation coefficient is small, this last effect dominates
the first effect. Hence, country 1 has an incentive to make a lower level of effort in order to increase
the marginal probability of remaining in the cooperative phase. Put another way, for a given level
of effort, increasing the correlation from 0 decreases this marginal probability.
In addition, increasing the correlation coefficient from 0 also decreases the equilibrium probabil-
ity of maintaining cooperation. Though an increase in the correlation decreases global uncertainty
it also makes the two continuation rules more contradictory. Indeed, 푥 = 휀1−휌휀2 and 푦 = 휀2−휌휀1
move in opposite directions as 휌 raises. To get an intuition of that result, assume that country 1
benefits from a positive shock while country 2 incurs a negative shock. In this case, the cut-off rule
associated to country 1 is more likely to be satisfied while the reverse holds for country 2. There
are two reasons for this. First, this country incurred a negative shock. Second, given the positive
correlation between country-specific shocks and the occurrence of a positive shock in country 1, the
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estimated level of effort in country 2 is more likely to lie above the cut-off point. It turns out that,
for small values of the correlation coefficient, the overall effect is negative which decreases the equi-
librium probability of remaining in the cooperative phase. It is worth pointing out that this type of
explanation is valid only for small values of the correlation coefficient. As shock-interdependence
becomes more important, it is less likely to have a positive shock in one country and a negative
shock in the other and the two continuation rules become less contradictory.
The following Proposition directly follows from Lemma 2.
Proposition 4 : Increasing the correlation between the two signals of public output from 0 reduces
the prospects for maintaining cooperation as a perfect public equilibrium.
Increasing the correlation coefficient has the effect of shifting down the 푅(퐺) function as depicted
in Figure 2.
G0
푅(퐺)
휌 > 0
퐺∗ = 푞ˆ − 푒∗
Figure 2
As shown in figure 2, the value of the cut-off point 푞ˆ that prevails in the model without shock-
interdependence is too low to achieve cooperation as a perfect public equilibrium when the two
region-specific shocks are positively correlated. As explained above, the cross-correlation in the
noisy public realization of the public good changes the inference process in a way that it decreases
the marginal benefit of exerting effort. Therefore, introducing correlation between region-specific
shocks requires a larger value of the cut-off point with respect to the case of independent shocks.
This in turn makes cooperation more difficult to sustain in the sense that, in every period, there
is more chance that the observed level of public output in one country (or both) falls below the
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cut-off point. In turn, it reduces the length of cooperative episodes as well as each country’s
present discounted payoff. Similarly, the optimal trigger equilibrium
(
푞˜, 푇˜
)
- such that 푅
(
퐺˜
)
= 0
- corresponds to the same level of the optimal trigger output 푞˜ but to a longer length of the optimal
punishment phase 푇˜ , which also results in lower present discounted payoffs of cooperation.
5 Conclusions
We have analyzed in this paper, the possibility to sustain cooperation between two countries that
make a public investment with cross-border externalities in the context of imperfect information.
Even though the level of public investment provided by each country is imperfectly observed, it
is shown that efficiency in local public goods provision can be sustained as a (stationary) perfect
public equilibrium through a simple cut-off trigger strategy. In the absence of correlation between
country-specific shocks, our comparative static results are quite intuitive. The two countries are
more likely to be able to sustain cooperation if they do not discount the future too heavily or
if public good spillovers are large. Introducing a marginal correlation between country-specific
shocks, however, restricts the possibility of implementing intertemporal cooperation because it
gives rise to a manipulation of information.
The framework analyzed in this paper might be extended on several fronts. In particular, we
have focused on perfect public equilibria which use Nash reversion as punishments to support the
Pareto optimal level of effort of the stage game. But this level does not necessarily corresponds to
the one which maximizes the present discounted value of a cooperative arrangement in the repeated
game. Furthermore, trigger strategies a` la Green and Porter (1984), while subgame perfect, are
not in general optimal. Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986) indeed show that optimal (symmetric)
equilibria in the Green-Porter model involve punishments more severe than Nash reversion and
that they have stochastic length. Another (more substantial) extension would be to characterize
renegotiation-proof equilibria. Indeed, with Green and Porter’s strategies but also with Abreu
and al ’s strategies, the two countries have strong incentives to renegotiate and continue with
their relationship when the public signals in one country (or both) falls and triggers punishment
(especially considering that both countries did not deviate on the equilibrium path). In turn,
possibility of renegotiation will (potentially) destroy countries’ incentives to cooperate in the first
place.5 A thorough investigation of this issue for our analysis of tacit cooperation in local public
goods supply would also be interesting for future research.
5In the Green-Porter model, Chen (1995) show that the only (weakly) renegotiation-proof equilibrium is the
repetition of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium if firms are restricted to playing symmetric equilibria.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We need to check that the second order condition is satisfied i.e.
∂2푉 퐶푡
∂푒21
≤ 0. Consider that region 2 acts
optimally i.e. 푒2 = 푒
∗. Using (6), the second-order condition is
∂2푉 퐶푡
∂푒21
=
∂2푊 (푒1, 푒
∗)
∂푒21
+ 훿
[
푉 퐶푡 − 푉 푁푡
] ∂2휇 (푒1, 푒∗)
∂푒21
≤ 0.
The one-period unit of payoff for region 1 is: 푊 (푒1, 푒
∗) = 푒1+훽푒
∗
1+훽 − 푒
2
1
2 . The second derivative of this
function with respect to 푒1 is then
∂2푊 (푒1,푒
∗)
∂푒21
= −1. The first derivative of the probability function with
respect to 푒1 is given by equation (13). The second derivative of the probability function with respect to
푒1 is then
∂2휇 (푒1, 푒
∗)
∂푒21
= (1− Φ
[
푞ˆ − 푒∗
휎
]
)
(푞ˆ − 푒1)
휎3
√
2휋
푒−
(푞ˆ−푒1)2
2휎2 .
The sign of this derivative is indeterminate and depends on the sign of (푞ˆ − 푒1). Therefore, the sign of
∂2푉 퐶푡
∂푒21
is also indeterminate. However, differentiating a third time, we have
∂3푉 퐶푡
∂푒31
=
∂3휇 (푒1, 푒
∗)
∂푒31
= (1− Φ
[
푞ˆ − 푒∗
휎
]
)
(푞ˆ − 푒1)2
휎5
√
2휋
푒−
(푞ˆ−푒1)2
2휎2 ≥ 0.
Hence,
∂2푉 퐶푡
∂푒21
is increasing in 푒1and in the limit, we have: lim
푒1→∞
∂2휇(푒1,푒
∗)
∂푒21
= 0 which implies that the
second-order condition is always satisfied.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
To simplify the presentation, we now simply write Φ instead of Φ(퐺
휎
). We first prove that the 푅(퐺)
function has a unique maximum. The derivative of 푅(퐺) with respect to 퐺 is given by
푅′ (퐺) =
훽2훿
(
1− 훿푇 )
2 (1 + 훽)
2
[
푈퐺 (Φ)푉 (Φ)− 푈 (Φ)푉퐺 (Φ)
(푉 (Φ))
2
]
where 푈 (Φ) = Φ퐺 (1− Φ), 푉 (Φ) = 1− 훿 (1− Φ)2− 훿푇+1(1− (1−Φ)2) and where Φ퐺 is the density
function. Let Φ퐺퐺 be the derivative of Φ퐺 with respect to 퐺. We have 푈퐺 (Φ) = Φ퐺퐺 (1− Φ)− (Φ퐺)2
and 푉퐺 (Φ) = 2훿
(
1− 훿푇 ) (1− Φ) Φ퐺. Note that Φ퐺퐺 = − 퐺휎2 Φ퐺 since Φ퐺 = 1휎√2휋 푒− 퐺22휎2 . Hence
푈퐺 (Φ) = −Φ퐺
[
퐺
휎2 (1− Φ) + Φ퐺
]
. Inserting these expressions into 푅′ (퐺) yields
푅′ (퐺) = 휑
−Φ퐺
[푉 (Φ)]
2
[ [
1− 훿 (1− Φ)2 − 훿푇+1(1− (1− Φ)2)
] (
퐺
휎2 (1− Φ) + Φ퐺
)
+2훿(1− 훿푇 ) (1− Φ)2 Φ퐺
]
where 휑 = 훽2훿
(
1− 훿푇 ) / [2 (1 + 훽)2].
Let 퐺˜ such that 푅′(퐺˜) = 0 and denote 퐴(퐺) the expression in the [.]. For the FOC to be satisfied,
we must have 퐺˜휎2 (1 − Φ) + Φ퐺 < 0 which implies that 퐺˜< 0. Calculating the derivative of 푅′ (퐺) =
휑−Φ퐺퐴(퐺)
[푉 (Φ)]2
with respect to 퐺, one finds
푅′′(퐺) = 휑
{
−Φ퐺퐺퐴 (퐺) + Φ퐺퐴
′ (퐺)
[푉 (Φ)]2
+
2Φ퐺퐴 (퐺)푉
′ (Φ)
[푉 (Φ)]3
}
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At 퐺 = 퐺˜, 푅′(퐺˜) = 퐴(퐺˜) = 0. Therefore 푅′′(퐺˜) ≤ 0 if and only if 퐴′(퐺˜) ≥ 0. One can show that
퐴′(퐺) =
(
(1− Φ)
휎2
− 2Φ퐺퐺
휎2
)[
1− 훿 (1− Φ)2 − 훿푇+1(1− (1− Φ)2)
]
− 2훿(1− 훿푇 ) [Φ퐺]2 (1− Φ)
푅′(퐺˜) = 0 implies that
2훿(1− 훿푇 ) (1− Φ) [Φ퐺]2 =
(
1− 훿 (1− Φ)2 − 훿푇+1(1− (1− Φ)2)
)(Φ퐺퐺
휎2
+
[Φ퐺]
2
(1− Φ))
)
Substituting this expression into 퐴′(퐺) yields
퐴′(퐺˜) =
[
1− 훿 (1− Φ)2 − 훿푇+1(1− (1− Φ)2)
]
.
(
(1− Φ)
휎2
+
[Φ퐺]
2
(1− Φ) −
Φ퐺퐺˜
휎2
)
which is strictly positive since 퐺˜ < 0, which implies that 푅′′(퐺˜) ≤ 0. Hence, for every point that satisfies
the first-order condition, the second derivative is negative i.e. 푅
′′
(퐺˜) ≤ 0. Therefore, the 푅 (.) function
has a unique maximum in 퐺˜. (If the 푅 (.) function had more than one maximum, the 푅 (.) function would
have a minimum and hence a point that would satisfy the first-order condition and where the second
derivative would have been positive). Consequently, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of a cut-off point 푞ˆ such that the two countries have no incentives to deviate from the cooperative agreement
is 푅
(
퐺˜
)
≥ 0. Indeed, if this condition is satisfied, it implies that there exists 퐺∗ < 퐺˜ with 푅 (퐺∗) = 0.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Using the implicit function theorem, we have ∂퐺
∗
∂푇 = − ∂푅(퐺
∗)/∂푇
∂푅(퐺∗)/∂퐺∗ . Under the condition of existence of a
trigger strategy equilibrium, we have 푅′(퐺∗) > 0 since the 푅(.) function has a unique maximum 퐺˜ > 퐺∗.
We also have
∂푅 (퐺)
∂푇
= −훽
2Φ퐺(1− Φ)
2 (1 + 훽)
2
(1− 훿) 훿푇+1(log 훿)[
1− 훿 (1− Φ)2 − 훿푇+1(1− (1− Φ)2)
]2
which is positive since log 훿 < 0. This implies that ∂퐺
∗
∂푇 < 0.
Similarly, the change in the equilibrium value of 퐺∗ following a change in the discount parameter 훽 is
given by ∂퐺
∗
∂훽
= − ∂푅(퐺
∗)/∂훽
∂푅(퐺∗)/∂퐺∗ . Again 푅
′ (퐺∗) > 0 (under the condition of existence) and the derivative of
푅 (퐺∗) with respect to 훽 is given by
∂푅(퐺∗)
∂훽
= − 1
(1 + 훽)2
+
2훽
(1 + 훽)3
훿(1− 훿푇 )Φ′(1− Φ)
2 [1− 훿(1− Φ)2 − 훿푇+1(1− (1− Φ)2)]
=
푅(퐺)
훽(1 + 훽)
+
훽
(1 + 훽)3
훿(1− 훿푇 )Φ′(1− Φ)
2 [1− 훿(1− Φ)2 − 훿푇+1(1− (1− Φ)2)]
For 퐺 = 퐺∗, 푅(퐺∗) = 0 and so
∂푅(퐺∗)
∂훽
> 0. Therefore, we have ∂퐺
∗
∂훽 < 0.
Finally, the change in the equilibrium value of 퐺∗ following a change in the variance of each specific-
country shock 휎 is given by ∂퐺
∗
∂휎
= − ∂푅(퐺
∗)/∂휎
∂푅(퐺∗)/∂퐺∗ . Again, 푅
′(퐺∗) > 0 and we also have
∂푅 (퐺∗)
∂휎
=
훽2훿
(
1− 훿푇 )
2 (1 + 훽)
2
[
푈휎 (Φ)푉 (Φ)− 푈 (Φ)푉휎 (Φ)
(푉 (Φ))
2
]
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where (again) 푈 (Φ) = Φ퐺 (1− Φ), 푉 (Φ) = 1− 훿 (1− Φ)2− 훿푇+1(1− (1−Φ)2). Let use the following
notations : Φ휎 = ∂Φ(
퐺
휎 )/∂휎 and Φ퐺휎 = ∂
2Φ(퐺휎 )/∂퐺∂휎 = ∂Φ퐺(
퐺
휎 )/∂휎. We then have 푈휎 (Φ) =
Φ퐺휎 (1− Φ) − Φ퐺Φ휎 and 푉휎 (Φ) = 2훿
(
1− 훿푇 ) (1− Φ) Φ휎. Recall that Φ퐺 = 1휎√2휋 푒− 퐺22휎2 . Hence,
Φ휎 = − 퐺휎2√2휋 푒
− 퐺2
2휎2 = −퐺휎 Φ퐺 and Φ퐺휎 = Φ퐺
(
퐺2
휎3 − 1휎
)
. Therefore, 푈휎 (Φ) = Φ퐺
[
(1− Φ)
(
퐺2
휎3 − 1휎
)
+ 퐺휎 Φ퐺
]
and 푉휎 (Φ) = −퐺휎 2훿
(
1− 훿푇 ) (1− Φ) Φ퐺. Inserting these expressions into ∂푅(퐺∗)∂휎 yields
∂푅 (퐺∗)
∂휎
= 휑
Φ퐺
[푉 (Φ)]
2
[ (
(1− Φ)
(
퐺2
휎3 − 1휎
)
+ 퐺휎 Φ퐺
) [
1− 훿 (1− Φ)2 − 훿푇+1(1− (1− Φ)2)
]
+퐺휎 2훿
(
1− 훿푇 ) (1− Φ)2 Φ퐺
]
where again 휑 = 훽2훿
(
1− 훿푇 ) / [2 (1 + 훽)2].
We also have 푅(퐺∗) = 0 which implies that
훿(1− 훿푇 )Φ퐺(1− Φ) = 2(1 + 훽)
훽
[
1− 훿 (1− Φ)2 − 훿푇+1 (1− (1− 휙)2)]
Multiplying both terms of the equality by 2(1− Φ)퐺휎 and substituting into ∂푅(퐺
∗)
∂휎 , one can obtain
∂푅 (퐺∗)
∂휎
= 휑
Φ퐺
[푉 (Φ)]
2
휎
[
1− 훿(1− Φ)2 − 훿푇+1(1− (1− Φ)2] ∗[
퐺∗
(
(1− Φ) 퐺
∗
휎2
+ Φ퐺
)
+ (1− Φ)
(
4 (1 + 훽)퐺∗
훽
− 1
)]
The first term in brackets is positive. The second term in brackets is the sum of two terms. The first of
these terms is positive. Indeed, from the proof that the 푅(.) function has a unique maximum 퐺˜ which
satisfies 푅′
(
퐺˜
)
= 0, we have (1− Φ) 퐺∗휎 + Φ퐺∗ < 0 and 퐺∗ < 퐺˜ < 0. The second term of the second
term in brackets is negative. The sign of
∂푅(퐺∗)
∂휎 is therefore indeterminate.
6.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Let us start by studying the impact of the correlation coefficient on the equilibrium probability given by
휇(푒∗) =
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
[∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
푓(푦∣푥)푑푦
]
푓(푥)푑푥
where
푓(푥) =
1√
2휋
1
휎
√
1− 휌2 exp
− 푥2
2휎2(1−휌2) and 푓(푦∣푥) = 1√
2휋
1
휎(1− 휌2) exp
− (푦+휌푥)2
2휎2(1−휌2)2 .
Differentiating the equilibrium probability of remaining in the cooperative phase with respect to the cor-
relation coefficient, yields
∂휇(푒∗)
∂휌
=
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
푑푓(푥)
푑휌
[∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
푓(푦∣푥)푑푦
]
푑푥+
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
푓(푥)
[∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
푑푓(푦∣푥)
푑휌
푑푦
]
푑푥.
We focus on an increase in 휌 from 0. It is easily verified that
푑푓(푥)
푑휌
∣휌=0 = 0 and 푑푓(푦∣푥)
푑휌
∣휌=0 = − 1√
2휋휎
exp−
푦2
2휎2
휎2
푥푦.
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Therefore,
∂휇(푒∗)
∂휌
∣휌=0 = −
⎡⎣ 1
휎
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
exp−
푥2
2휎2√
2휋휎
푥푑푥
⎤⎦2 < 0.
Let us turn to the impact of the correlation coefficient on the marginal probability
∂휇(푒1,푒
∗)
∂푒1
of remaining
in the cooperative phase. Using (23), we have that
∂휇 (푒1, 푒
∗)
∂푒1
=
[∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗+휌(푒1−푒∗)
푓(푦∣푞ˆ − 푒1)푑푦
]
푓(푞ˆ − 푒1)− 휌
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒1
푓(푞ˆ − 푒∗ + 휌(푒1 − 푒∗)∣푥)푓(푥)푑푥.
Let evaluate this expression at 푒1 = 푒
∗. We have
∂휇 (푒1, 푒
∗)
∂푒1
∣푒1=푒∗ =
[∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
푓(푦∣푞ˆ − 푒∗)푑푦
]
푓(푞ˆ − 푒∗)− 휌
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒1
푓(푞ˆ − 푒∗∣푥)푓(푥)푑푥.
Differentiating the above expression with respect to 휌 yields
∂(∂휇(푒1,푒
∗)
∂푒1
∣푒1=푒∗)
∂휌
=
∂푓(푞ˆ − 푒∗)
∂휌
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
푓(푦∣푞ˆ − 푒∗)푑푦 + 푓(푞ˆ − 푒∗)
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
∂푓(푦∣푞ˆ − 푒∗)
∂휌
푑푦
−
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
푓(푞ˆ − 푒∗∣푥)푓(푥)푑푥− 휌
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
∂푓(푞ˆ − 푒∗∣푥)
∂휌
푓(푥)푑푥
−휌
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
푓(푞ˆ − 푒∗∣푥)∂푓(푥)
∂휌
푑푥
Now let evaluate this expression at 휌 = 0, we have
∂(∂휇(푒1,푒
∗)
∂푒1
∣푒1=푒∗)
∂휌
∣휌=0 = ∂푓(푞ˆ − 푒
∗)
∂휌
∣휌=0
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
푓(푦∣푞ˆ − 푒∗)푑푦
+푓(푞ˆ − 푒∗)
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
∂푓(푦∣푞ˆ − 푒∗)
∂휌
∣휌=0푑푦 −
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
푓(푞ˆ − 푒∗∣푥)푓(푥)푑푥.
Again, it is easily verified that
∂푓(푞ˆ−푒∗)
∂휌 ∣휌=0 = 0 and ∂푓(푦∣푞ˆ−푒
∗)
∂휌 ∣휌=0 = − (푞ˆ−푒
∗)
휎2
exp
− 푦
2
2휎2√
2휋휎
푦. Hence, the
above expression can be rewritten as it follows
∂(∂휇(푒1,푒
∗)
∂푒1
∣푒1=푒∗)
∂휌
∣휌=0 = − (푞ˆ − 푒
∗)
휎2
푓(푞ˆ − 푒∗)
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
exp−
푦2
2휎2√
2휋휎
푦푑푦 − 푓(푞ˆ − 푒∗)
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
exp−
푥2
2휎2√
2휋휎
푑푥.
One can equivalently rewrite the above expression as
∂(∂휇(푒1,푒
∗)
∂푒1
∣푒1=푒∗)
∂휌
∣휌=0 = −푓(푞ˆ − 푒∗)
[
(푞ˆ − 푒∗)
휎
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
휎
exp−
푦2
2√
2휋
푦푑푦 +
∫ +∞
푞ˆ−푒∗
휎
exp−
푥2
2√
2휋
푑푥
]
.
Let us study the term in brackets. Let 푍 ≡ 푞ˆ−푒∗휎 and let define the 퐻(.) function as
퐻(푍) = 푍
∫ +∞
푍
exp−
푡2
2√
2휋
푡푑푡+
∫ +∞
푍
exp−
푡2
2√
2휋
푑푡.
When 휌 = 0, it has been shown in the previous section that 푞ˆ < 푒∗. Therefore, 푍 is negative. We then
study the 퐻(.) function for all negative values of 푍.
Since 퐻 ′′(푍) = 푍 exp
−푍2
2√
2휋
(푍2− 2), 퐻 ′ is first decreasing and then increasing over ]−∞, 0]. In addition,
it is easily verified that 퐻 ′(푍) =
∫ +∞
푍
exp−
푡2
2√
2휋
푡푑푡 − (푍2 + 1) exp−
푍2
2√
2휋
is equal to 0 at the boundaries.
Therefore, 퐻 ′ is non positive for all 푍 ≤ 0 which implies that 퐻(푍) is a decreasing function. Since,
퐻(0) = 1/2 > 0, it follows that 퐻(푍) ≥ 0 for all 푍 ≤ 0. We then have that ∂(
∂휇(푒1,푒
∗)
∂푒1
∣푒1=푒∗ )
∂휌 ∣휌=0 < 0.
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6.5 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of this Proposition directly follows from Lemma 2. The sign of the derivative of the LHS of
equation (12) with respect to 휌 is the same as the sign of
∂(
∂휇(푒1,푒∗)
∂푒1
∣푒1=푒∗)
∂휌
[
1− 훿휇 (푒∗)− 훿푇+1(1− 휇 (푒∗))
]
+
∂휇 (푒1, 푒
∗)
∂푒1
∣푒1=푒∗훿(1− 훿푇 )
∂휇(푒∗)
∂휌
Using lemma 2, this expression is negative for 휌 = 0 since
∂(
∂휇(푒1,푒
∗)
∂푒1
∣푒1=푒∗ )
∂휌 ∣휌=0 < 0 and ∂휇(푒
∗)
∂휌 ∣휌=0.
Therefore, increasing correlation has the effect of shifting down the 푅(퐺) function and so 퐺∗ (if it exists)
raises, which amounts to making cooperation more difficult.
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